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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 646 
Accident time: 12:15 Accident Date: 11/10/2009 





Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: OPS, 14/01-28 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file.  Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as 
more information becomes available. 
The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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 Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS, 14/01-28  
Date: December 1st 2009 
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] - MDG -13 
DEMINING ACCIDENT  
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] -MDG-
13 demining accident occurred on 11 October 2009 in Kar Kar village, Baghlan district of 
Baghlan Province. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group]- DG-13 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC NE to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the deminer of [Demining group] MDG-13. The accident occurred at 
12:15 hours, 11 Oct 2009 in Task # AF/13/1312/32114/MF 5274 located in Kar Kar village, 
Baghlan district of Baghlan Province. 
SUMMARY: 
Task # AF/13/1312/32114/MF 5274 is an anti-personnel mine contaminated area which was 
recorded by LIS under the community No. 1473 SHA 01 then polygon by [another demining 
group]. This area was mined during the internal war from 1996-2001 because of its location 
from the military point of view. As the area was of military importance for both side of conflict 
faction, so was hand to hand between them and they put mines to prevent their positions from 
the attacks of each other. So far 2 accidents on human and 3 on animal have been reported 
in this area. Size of the area is 39150sqm. During the clearance operation, 33770sqm area 
cleared and 34 anti-personnel mines were found/destroyed by MDG-13. 
On 11 Oct 2009 at 12:15 am while [the Victim] deminer was excavating a detected signal in 
his clearance lane, his bayonet hit top of an anti-personnel mine and caused it to go off. 
According to the investigation report, it seems that the deminer started the excavation drill 
directly from the centre of the detected signal by his bayonet and caused the mine to be 
exploded. The deminer had the PPE and visor but as the visor was not properly used so he 
got some superficial injuries on his face, eyes. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
However the victim was a trained and experienced deminer and there was no any obvious 
point of concern with him, but he was careless during the investigation of detected signal. The 
other important point outlined in investigation report was: "the assistant team leader was 
unable to control and supervise the deminers under his supervision", and he is lack of basic 
knowledge of reading and writing. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
The following points are to be considered: 
A. It is the responsibilities of respective IP's operations department to make sure that a proper 
system of command and control exists in the field, 
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B. Inappropriate use of visor resulted in injuries to the eyes and face of involved deminer, 
therefore, all the command groups are strongly recommended to strengthen their focus on 
this point and never allow their deminers to use the PPE inappropriately. 
C. The [Demining group] Operations department is to take more professional steps to build up 
and develop a strong capacity of command and control mechanism within their teams and 
assign qualified people as Team Leader, Asst Team Leader and Section Leaders.  
D. Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required 
to be submitted to the MACCA OPS department by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue 
date of this letter. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 829 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Eyes, minor Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators found that the Victim was working inappropriately with his visor raised and his 
error was not corrected. The Investigators criticised the quality of the field supervision, which 
had no effective control. The provision of appropriately qualified, experienced and effective 
field supervision is a management responsibility so the secondary cause is listed as a 
Management Control Inadequacy.  
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary 
implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the 
UN to share it with others is regrettable.   
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